This article explores how recent decisions reveal a divergence in the courts’ approach to service of claim forms, with a strict stance on jurisdiction contrasted against a more pragmatic, flexible approach to procedural compliance.

Effective service of claim forms is a cornerstone of civil procedure in the English courts. It ensures that a defendant is properly notified of proceedings and has a fair opportunity to respond. If service is defective or cannot be proven, a claim risks being set aside, delayed, or even struck out entirely., A failure to serve correctly can therefore undermine otherwise strong claims, increase costs, and create satellite litigation on procedural points rather than the merits.

Two recent court decisions show a tension in the courts’ approach: strictness where questions of jurisdiction are engaged, and flexibility where case management is concerned.

In Fridman v Agrofirma Oniks LLC [2026] EWCA Civ 139, the Court of Appeal clarified the limits on serving a defendant within the jurisdiction. The claimant attempted to serve proceedings at the defendant’s last known London address under CPR 6.9. However, the defendant, who was a Russian oligarch subject to UK sanctions and an immigration exclusion, was legally barred from entering the UK. The Court of Appeal held that service was invalid because the defendant was not “present” in England and Wales and that it would be legally incoherent for the state to assert jurisdiction based on presence while simultaneously prohibiting entry.

The application of this decision may create practical difficulties. Claimants dealing with sanctioned or excluded individuals, who often retain substantial UK connections, may find themselves unable to serve within the jurisdiction despite clear factual links. This potentially risks incentivising procedural avoidance, particularly in politically sensitive or sanctions-driven contexts. The outcome may frustrate access to justice for claimants who must now resort to more complex (and costly) alternative service routes. In Fridman, the court disapproved of the Kamali case which highlighted when proceedings have been issued for service within the jurisdiction, there is no requirement for the defendant to be within the jurisdiction at the time of service for service to be effective. This signals a retreat from a more pragmatic interpretation of presence under the CPR.

By contrast, Global Fintech Investments Holding AG v Linklaters LLP [2025] EWHC 2969 (Comm) adopts a notably pragmatic stance. The High Court considered the consequences of failing to comply with a CPR 7.7 notice requiring service or discontinuance.

CPR 7.7 is a procedural mechanism within the Civil Procedure Rules designed to prevent delay between the issue of a claim and its service. Once a claim form has been issued, a claimant has a limited period (4 months – or 6 months in the case of service out of the jurisdiction) in which to serve it. While prompt service is advisable, in practice, claimants often issue claims protectively where a limitation period is about to expire or delay service because investigations are ongoing.

Under CPR 7.7(1), a defendant may therefore serve a notice on the claimant requiring them either to serve the claim form within a specified time (which must be at least 14 days) or discontinue the claim. If the claimant fails to comply with that notice, CPR 7.7(3) allows the defendant to apply to the court. Importantly, the court is not then obliged to dismiss the claim. Instead, it has a broad discretion to decide what order is just in the circumstances, which may include dismissal but could also involve allowing the claim to proceed or making other case management directions.

In Global Fintech, the claimant delayed service until the end of the claim form’s period of validity and did not comply with the defendant’s notice under CPR 7.7. Despite this, the court refused to dismiss the claim, as there is no presumption in favour of dismissal. The court also stressed that CPR 7.7 should not be used as a backdoor strike-out mechanism where a claim has a coherent cause of action. This reflects a broader judicial trend of prioritising substantive justice over procedural technicalities. However, the decision does also raise some concerns.

First, the court’s interpretation arguably dilutes the utility of CPR 7.7 as a tool for defendants. If non-compliance does not meaningfully weigh in favour of dismissal, the provision risks becoming toothless. Defendants may incur costs pursuing applications that ultimately yield little procedural advantage. Secondly, the decision could be seen as unduly lenient toward claimants who issue protective claims close to the expiry of a limitation period when they are not yet in a position to fully particularise their claims The court in Global Fintech  distinguished the decision in Nomura International plc v Granada Group Ltd and others [2007] EWHC 642 (Comm) a case which involved a successful application to strike out a claim for abuse of process. The claimant in Nomura had issued a claim form protectively because of limitation concerns despite lacking a properly formulated case. However, in Global Fintech, the court found that the claimant’s claim form had some specificity and a coherent cause of action.

However, the underlying risk of abuse of process through the issue of speculative or underdeveloped claims remains. This judgment could therefore encourage a “wait and see” approach by claimants, potentially undermining procedural discipline. Taken together, the cases highlight an inconsistency in emphasis: Fridman reflects strict adherence to jurisdictional principles, while Global Fintech demonstrates flexibility in procedural enforcement.

Collyer Bristow can help you navigate this complex area of civil procedure. This includes advising on valid methods of service in challenging jurisdictional situations, mitigating risks arising from sanctions or cross-border issues, and deploying or resisting procedural applications effectively. Crucially, early, proactive advice can prevent service missteps from escalating to the point where a valid claim is at risk of being dismissed.